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The concept of fair representation of voters in a committee representing different 
voters’ groups, such as national representations in union of states, is discussed. This 
concept, introduced into discussion about voting rights in the Council of European 
Union in 2004, was narrowed to proposal of distribution of voting weights among 
the member states proportionally to square roots of population. Such a distribution 
should guarantee the same indirect voting power to each EU citizen, measured by 
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In the late spring of 2004 the following draft of open letter of European scientists to the 
governments of the EU member states was distributed in European academic community: 
 
In the last few years there has been an intense discussion on the voting procedure in the Council of 
Ministers of the European Union. With 25 member states (and two more in the near future) it is 
not a simple task to make reliable judgements on the implications of the various voting systems 
that have been suggested.  
   
We the undersigned wish to draw the attention of EU Governments to the fact that scientific 
methods can be used and need to be used to analyse, understand and design complex voting 
systems. In particular:  
 
1) From a scientific point of view there are obvious drawbacks to the systems of voting in the 
European Council discussed so far. The experts on voting theory agree that the Treaty of Nice 
gives too much power to a number of countries while others obtain less power than appropriate. 
On the other hand, the draft European Constitution assigns too much power to the biggest and the 
smallest states in a systematic way, while the middle size countries do not get their due share of 
influence (see the tables attached). Moreover, the Nice system will be extremely ineffective due to 
its high quotas.  
2) The ‘compromises’ proposed recently to change the quota in the draft Constitution either to 
65% of the population and 55% of the states or to 55% of the population and 55% of the states 
make the situation for several countries even worse than in the draft Constitution. As can be 
shown by mathematical analysis, it is not the quotas that are mainly at fault, but rather the system 
of proposed weights. 
3) The basic democratic principle that the vote of any citizen of a Member State ought to be worth 
as much as for any other Member State is strongly violated both in the voting system of the Treaty 
of Nice and in the rules given in the draft Constitution. It can be proved rigorously that this 
principle is fulfilled if the influence of each country in the Council is proportional to the square 
root of its population. This is known as ‘Penrose’s Square Root Law’. Such a system may be 
complemented by a simple majority of states.  
4) A voting system that obeys the Square Root Law, i.e., which gives equal power to all citizens, is 
easily implemented. It is representative, objective, transparent, and effective. Such a system was 
proposed by Swedish diplomats already in 2000, and recently endorsed in a number of scientific 
articles. 
 
We urge our politicians to take into consideration the contribution of the scientific community to 
this issue. We are highly concerned that any system implemented without due regard to the 
scientific analysis of voting power may become a major drawback to a democratic development in 
the European Union.  
   2 
  Open letter was originally signed by the group of nine distinguished scientists from six 
EU countries, calling themselves “Scientists for a democratic Europe”, later cosigned by 38 
other colleagues, and submitted to the governments of member states and to Commission
1. In 
this paper we want to explore the statements. 
 
  The basic idea of the proposal supported by the open letter is the following concept of 
“fairness”: If the European Union is a union of citizens, then it is fair when each citizen 
(independently on her national affiliation) exercises the same influence over the union issues. 
It is achieved when voting weight of each national representation in Council of Ministers is 
proportional to the square root of population. 
 
  So called square root rule is attributed to British statistician Lionel Penrose (1946) and 
is closely related to indirect voting power measured by Penrose-Banzhaf power index. 
Different aspects of square root rule are analysed in Felsenthal and Machover (1998, 2007), 
Laruelle and Widgrén (1998), Baldwin and Widgrén (2004), Plechanovová  (2004), 
Słomczyński and Życzkowski (2006, 2007), Hosli (2008) and Leech and Aziz (2008). 
 
Concept of indirect voting power is based on the following rather artificial 
construction: Assume n districts (e.g. regions) with different size of population (voters), 
represented in a super-regional committee that decides different agendas relevant for the 
whole entity. Each district representation in the committee has some voting weight (number 
of votes). Decision making process is performed by series of referenda in each district and 
districts’ representations in the committee are voting according results of referenda. In each 
district an individual citizen has the same voting weight (one vote) that provides him with a 
voting power (each citizen from one district has the same voting power). Also each district 
representation has some voting power in the committee that follows from its voting weight. 
Then indirect voting power of a citizen from particular district is given by product of her 
voting power in local referenda and voting power of her representation in the committee. The 
representation of districts in the committee is considered fair, if each citizen has the same 




Let N be a set of members of a committee and w = (w1, w2, … , wn) be a nonnegative 
vector of weights (e.g. votes or shares) of committee members. A subset S ˛ N of committee 
















(quota q represents minimal total weight necessary to approve the proposal).The triple [N, q, w] 
is called a simple weighted committee. Voting configuration S is called a winning one if 
() wSq ‡ and a losing one in opposite case. 
 
                                                 
1 The letter (including added tables) and list of its signatories see e.g. at the following web 
address: http://www.esi2.us.es/~mbilbao/pdffiles/letter.pdf 
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Voting power analysis seeks  an  answer to the following question: Given a  simple 
weighted committee, what is an influence of its members over the outcome of voting? Voting 
power of a member i is a probability that i will be decisive in the sense that such situation 
appears in which she would be able to reverse the outcome of voting by reversing her vote. To 
define a particular power measure means to identify some qualitative property (decisiveness) 
whose presence or absence in voting process can be established and quantified ( e.g. Nurmi 
(1997)). Generally there are two such properties related to committee members’ positions in 
voting, that are being used as a starting point for quantification of voting power: swing position 
and pivotal position of committee members. 
 
LetS be a winning  configuration in  a simple weighted committee [N, q,  w].  A 
member S i˛ has a swing in  configuration  S  if  w(S)  ≥ q and w(S\{i}) < q. Assuming all 
configurations equally likely, it makes sense to evaluate a priori voting power of each member of 
the committee by probability to have a swing. This probability is measured by absolute Penrose-






Nq - F= w  
(where si is the number of swings of the member i and 2
n-1 is the number of coalitions with i as a 
member). To compare relative power of different members of the committee, the relative form of 














Let the numbers n ,..., 2 , 1 be the fixed names of committee members and  ) ,..., , ( 2 1 n i i i  be a 
permutation of the members of the committee, and let us assume that member k  is in a position 
r  in this permutation, i.e.  r i k = . A member k of the committee is in a pivotal situation (has a 
pivot) with respect to a permutation ) ,..., , ( 2 1 n i i i , if w(i1,i2,… ,ir-1) < q and w(i1, … ,ir-1,ir) ‡ q.  
what implies w(ir+1,ir+2,… ,in) < 0 and w(ir,ir+1,… ,in) ‡ 1. Hence, outcome of voting will be in this 
case identical with the vote of member k=ir, “yes” if she votes “ yes” and “ no” if she votes “ no”. 
Assume that a strict ordering of members in a given permutation expresses an intensity of their 
support (preferences) for a particular issue in the sense that, if a member  s i precedes in this 
permutation a member t i , then support by  s i  for the particular proposal to be decided is stronger 
than support by t i . One can expect that the group supporting the proposal will be formed in the 
order of positions of members in the given permutation. If it is so, then the member k  will be in 
situation when the group composed from preceding members in the given permutation still does 
not have enough of votes to pass the proposal, and a group of members placed behind her in the 
permutation has not enough of votes to block the proposal. The group that will manage his 
support will win. Member in a pivotal situation has a decisive influence on the final outcome. 
Assuming many voting acts and all possible preference orderings equally likely, under the full 
veil of ignorance about other aspects of individual members’ preferences, it makes sense to 
evaluate an a priori voting power of each committee member as a probability of being in pivotal 
situation. This probability is measured by the SS-power index: 







F= w  
( i p is the number of pivotal positions of the committee memberi,  and ! n is the number of 
permutations of the committee members, i.e., number of different orderings of  n elements). 























(i.e. relative SS-power index is equal to absolute one). 
 
3. Penrose-Banzhaf indirect power 
 
  Let N be the set of districts (regions) and pi population of district i, [N, q, w] be a 
committee of districts and wi be a weight of the district i in the committee. Consider a 
randomly selected “ yes-no” issue and suppose that people in each district decide their 
approval or disapproval by referendum (each citizen has one vote). For simplicity assume the 
number of voters participating in referendum in district i is equal to the number of district’s 
population, and the quota (number of votes required to approve proposal) is equal 
1
2
< mi < pi.  
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This gives number of swings of a single citizen in district referendum (changing her vote she 
will change the outcome). Using a probability of swing as a measure of voting power 
(assuming that all voting configurations are equally probable), we obtain Penrose-Banzhaf 















The voting power of each citizen is decreasing function of the size of population and not 
increasing function of the quota. 
If we assume simple majority quota (proposal supported by half of voters plus one) 
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(least integer greater than pi/2), then the number of cases in which the average citizen of 
district i  has a swing (the outcome of district referendum will be identical with her vote) is 
equal to  
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(power of a citizen of i, absolute Penrose-Banzhaf index). Using Stirling’s formula 






p 2 !»   
(Felsenthal and Machover (1998)), for sufficiently large pi we obtain approximation 





(proof see Laruelle and Widgren (1998)). The larger size of population in district i, the 
smaller is individual citizen Penrose-Banzhaf power in referendum-type district voting. 
  Following the same reasoning we can estimate the voting power of a citizen in a 
global (all districts) referendum as 










  If the districts’ representations in the committee of districts are voting in each issue 
according to results of districts’ referenda and Fi (district representation) is the Penrose-Banzhaf 
power of the district i representation in the districts’ committee, then 





is the i-th district average citizen (indirect) power in the districts’ committee decision making. 
 
  To guarantee equal indirect power of citizens from different districts in the districts’ 
committee, it must hold 







for all i, where a is a positive constant. It holds if 





a F=  
i.e. if voting power of member states is proportional to the square roots of population. It 
happens when relative voting power of districts is equal to 












  Finally, to fix indirect voting power of an average citizen we require that it is equal to 
her voting power in a global referendum of citizens of all districts, what means that voting 
power of representation of district i in the committee should be equal   6 















(probability that representation of district i will have a swing in the districts’ committee 
voting). 
 
  Substituting European Union member states for districts and Council of Ministers for 
districts’ committee, we can apply the concept of “fair representation” on distribution of 
member states’ voting weights in the Council. 
 
To illustrate concepts discussed above let us consider a simple example of a 
hypothetical union of four member states A, B, C, and D (see Table 1). Data provided in 
Table 1 are not based on calculation of member states’ PB-power indices with some particular 
voting quota in hypothetical union Council, they indicate, having the square root estimations 
of citizens’ power in member states, what absolute national voting power in the Council 
guarantees equals indirect power of citizens of different member states, measured by union 
citizen power in global referendum.  
 
Table 1 


















































































A  100000000  10000  56,18  41,67  0,000079788  0,749531689  0,4167  0,000059804 
B  49000000  7000  27,53  29,17  0,000113984  0,524672182  0,2917  0,000059804 
C  25000000  5000  14,04  20,83  0,000159577  0,374765844  0.2083  0,000059804 
D  4000000  2000  2,25  8,33  0,000398942  0,149906338  0.0833  0,000059804 
S  178000000  24000  100  100  0,000059804  1,798876054  1,0000   
Source: own calculations 
pi denotes population of member state i 
 
 
4. Voting weights, quota and voting power 
 
  It was rigorously proved how fair distribution of voting power in the Council should 
look like to guarantee equal indirect voting power of all European citizens (providing system 
of referenda is considered a mechanism of decision making). But the open letter says 
something more: It can be proved rigorously that this principle is fulfilled if the influence of 
each country in the Council is proportional to the square root of its population. This is known 
as ‘Penrose’s Square Root Law’. 
   
  There is still one problem to be solved: what allocation of voting weights among 
member states leads to proportionality of Penrose-Banzhaf power to the square roots of 
population? Supporters of square root rule are proposing to allocate the weights in the Council 
proportionally to the square root of population, assuming that in committees with large   7 
number of members the distribution of weights is a good proxy of voting power. But a priori 
voting power seldom reflects exact distribution of voting weights. If [N, q, w] is a simple 
weighted committee and F[N, q, w] is a vector of power indices of its members, then usually 
F[N, q, w] „ aw.  
 
  Originally it was assumed that voting weights proportional to square roots of 
population together with simple majority quota provide solution of the problem. But it 
appeared that it is generally not the case. Being aware of this problem, Słomczyński and 
Życzkowski (2006) formulated the following minimization problem: 
 
  Minimize sum of square residuals between the normalized Penrose-Banzhaf power 
indices and voting weights defined as proportional to the square roots of population according 
to the quota q 



















for q ˛ (50, 100] in percentage of total weight. They used heuristic and found approximation 
of optimal quota q » 61.4% for the EU of 27. So, the final proposal, known as “Jagiellonian 
Compromise”, reads as follows: “The voting weight of each member state is allocated 
proportionally to the square root of its population, the decision of the Council being taken if 
the sum of weights exceeds a (certain) quota” (Słomczyński and Życzkowski (2006)), setting 
the quota equal to 61,4% of the sum of square roots of population in the member states of the 
EU. Let us call it SZ distance from equal indirect power. 
 
  Later they improved their quota estimation and provided general quota approximation 
formula 
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minimizing distance between vector of weights and vector of power indices (see Słomczyński 
and Życzkowski (2007), Leech and Aziz (2008)). Let us call this approximation SZ optimal 
quota. 
 
  Berg and Holler (1986) provide the following property of simple weighted 
committees: Let [N, Q, w] be a family of committees with the same weights w and set of 
different quotas Q = {q1, q2, … , qm} such that 0,5 < qk £ 1, j is a probability distribution over 
Q where jk is a probability with which a random mechanism selects the quota qk and Fik(N, 
qk, w) be a power index in the committee [N, qk, w] with a quota qk ˛ Q, then  








F=F ￿ ww  
is an expected power of the member i in the randomized committee [N, Q(j), w]. For any 
vector of weights there exist a finite set Q and a probability distribution j such that 






F=F= ￿ ww  
Randomized voting rule Q(j) leads to strictly proportional power. 
   8 
  For any simple weighted committee there exists a finite number of different intervals 
(g0, g1], … , (gm-1, gm] such, that for any quota from a particular interval (gk-1, gk] the sets of 
winning and losing voting configurations are the same and for quotas from different intervals 
the sets of winning and losing configurations are different. These intervals are called quota 
intervals of stable power. 
 
  From final number of quota intervals of stable power it follows that there exists exact 



















where j = 1, 2, … , m, m is the number of intervals of stable power and  qj ˛ (gj-1, gj]. Quota q* 
provides only good approximation, it does not guarantee the exact proportionality of power 
indices and weights.  Moreover, this property is not related specifically to square root rule and 
holds for any reasonable power index (e.g. Shapley-Shubik) as well. If (gt-1, gt] is the quota 
interval of stable power minimizing distance between vector of power indices and vector of 
weights and approximation  
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i s correct, then it must hold  
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  To illustrate concepts discussed above let us consider a simple example of a union of 
four member states A, B, C, and D (basic data see in Table 1). 
 
  Let us check relation between weights and quota for our hypothetical union from 
Table 1. Assume that weights in the Council are equal to square roots of population  i p and 
quota is fixed on the level 
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    In Table 2 we provide absolute and relative Penrose-Banzhaf power indices of national 
representations using this quota, and resulting indirect voting power of citizens of each 
member state and union citizen. Euclidean distance is used to compare calculated indirect 
power with theoretically equal one. The “ rigorously proved” square root rule remains to be 










   9 
Table 2 





















A  100000000  10000  3,00  0,3750  0,3750  0,000079788  0,000029921  0,001736111 
B  49000000  7000  3,00  0,3750  0,3750  0,000113984  0,000042744  0,006944444 
C  25000000  5000  1,00  0,1250  0,1250  0,000159577  0,000019947  0,006944444 













   
1,73611111E-02 
 
Source: own calculations 
   
In our case square root rule does not lead to equal indirect power: either quota formula 
is not correct, or square root rule is not as good approximation as it is declared to be (or both). 
 
  In Table 3 we provide full list of quota intervals of stable power and apply our exact 
algorithm for optimal quota. We can see that while SZ optimal quota is equal to 18671 (in 
weights) or 77,79%, exact optimal quota is from interval (12000, 14000], or any quota 
between 50,01% and 59,33%. There is no quota granting equal indirect power of citizens, the 
best SZ distance provided by exact optimal quota is 0,00347222, while SZ distance based on 
SZ optimal quota approximation is 0,01736111.    10 
Table 3 





















quota  (12000, 14000]             
A  100000000  10000  5,00  0,6250  0,4167  0,000079788  0,000049868  0 
B  49000000  7000  3,00  0,3750  0,2500  0,000113984  0,000042744  0,001736111 
C  25000000  5000  3,00  0,3750  0,2500  0,000159577  0,000059841  0,001736111 
D  4000000  2000  1,00  0,1250  0,0833  0,000398942  0,000049868  0 
  178000000  24000  12  1,5000  1  0,000059804    3,47222222E-03 
quota  (14000, 15000]             
A  100000000  10000  6,00  0,7500  0,6000  0,000079788  0,000059841  0,033611111 
B  49000000  7000  2,00  0,2500  0,2000  0,000113984  0,000028496  0,008402778 
C  25000000  5000  2,00  0,2500  0,2000  0,000159577  0,000039894  6,94444E-05 
D  4000000  2000  0,00  0,0000  0,0000  0,000398942  0,000000000  0,006944444 
  178000000  24000  10  1,2500  1  0,000059804    4,90277778E-02 
quota  (1500, 17000]               
A  100000000  10000  5,00  0,6250  0,5000  0,000079788  0,000049868  0,006944444 
B  49000000  7000  3,00  0,3750  0,3000  0,000113984  0,000042744  6,94444E-05 
C  25000000  5000  1,00  0,1250  0,1000  0,000159577  0,000019947  0,011736111 
D  4000000  2000  1,00  0,1250  0,1000  0,000398942  0,000049868  0,000277778 
  178000000  24000  10  1,2500  1  0,000059804    1,90277778E-02 
quota  (17000, 19000]             
A  100000000  10000  3,00  0,3750  0,3750  0,000079788  0,000029921  0,001736111 
B  49000000  7000  3,00  0,3750  0,3750  0,000113984  0,000042744  0,006944444 
C  25000000  5000  1,00  0,1250  0,1250  0,000159577  0,000019947  0,006944444 
D  4000000  2000  1,00  0,1250  0,1250  0,000398942  0,000049868  0,001736111 
  178000000  24000  8  1,0000  1  0,000059804    1,73611111E-02 
quota  (19000, 22000]             
A  100000000  10000  2,00  0,2500  0,3333  0,000079788  0,000019947  0,006944444 
B  49000000  7000  2,00  0,2500  0,3333  0,000113984  0,000028496  0,001736111 
C  25000000  5000  2,00  0,2500  0,3333  0,000159577  0,000039894  0,015625 
D  4000000  2000  0,00  0,0000  0,0000  0,000398942  0,000000000  0,006944444 
  178000000  24000  6  0,7500  1  0,000059804    3,12500000E-02 
quota  (22000, 24000]             
A  100000000  10000  1,00  0,1250  0,2500  0,000079788  0,000009974  0,027777778 
B  49000000  7000  1,00  0,1250  0,1667  0,000113984  0,000014248  0,015625 
C  25000000  5000  1,00  0,1250  0,1667  0,000159577  0,000019947  0,001736111 
D  4000000  2000  1,00  0,1250  0,1667  0,000398942  0,000049868  0,006944444 
  178000000  24000  4  0,5000  0,75  0,000059804    5,20833333E-02 
Source: own calculations 
 
5. Several remarks to square root rule 
 
  Model of equalization of indirect Penrose-Banzhaf power applied to distribution of 
voting weights in the EU is legitimate and scientifically justified. But it is not the unique way 
how to implement fairness principle and statements from open letter of European scientists 
are rather exaggerated. They are based on two different premises: a) on the concept of 
referenda type mechanism of decision making, which is crucial for the used principle of 
fairness itself, b) on the implicit assumption that Penrose-Banzhaf model is the only way how  
to quantify voting power, which is crucial for implementation. But exactly the same can be 
done with Shapley-Shubik model of voting power.    11 
  Let us comment first the used model of referenda based decision making mechanism. 
It contradicts the intuition of representative democracy and introduces as a reality a process of 
direct democracy. National representation in the Council of EU means government 
representation. With small exceptions governments do not feel political responsibility to the 
citizens, even in internal affairs. Citizens in multi-party systems do not elect the government, 
but they decide about composition of the Parliament. Government formation is based on 
trade-offs of political parties and individual members of the parliament. 
 
Assume that square root fairness principle is implemented on national level. It means 
that every voter should have the same indirect voting power independently on which party he 
voted for (by allocation of seats in the Parliament proportionally to square roots of votes the 
party obtained in election). Such a proposal would be immediately disqualified as a symptom 
of mental illness. Just to illustrate the consequences, hypothetical composition of 2006 Lower 
House of the Czech Parliament under the fairness square root rule is provided in Table 4. 
   
 
Table 4 
















Strana zdravé ho rozumu  24828  157,569  0,474033  2,444744  4,889488  5 
České  hnutí  za ná rodní  jednotu  216  14,69694  0,004124  0,228029  0,456057  0 
Balbí nova poetická  strana  6897  83,04818  0,131682  1,288524  2,577049  3 
Liberá lní  reformní  strana  253  15,90597  0,00483  0,246787  0,493575  0 
Prá vo a spravedlnost     12756  112,9425  0,243546  1,752346  3,504691  5 
Nezá vislí                       33030  181,7416  0,630631  2,81979  5,639581  5 
Česká  pravice               395  19,87461  0,007542  0,308362  0,616724  1 
Koruna česká               7293  85,39906  0,139243  1,324999  2,649998  3 
ODS                            1892475  1375,673  36,1324  21,34409  42,68818  43 
ČSSD                          1728827  1314,849  33,00792  20,40038  40,80076  41 
Unie svobody                16457  128,2848  0,314208  1,990389  3,980777  4 
Helax - Ostrava se baví   1735  41,65333  0,033126  0,646267  1,292535  1 
Pravý  blok                      20382  142,7655  0,389147  2,215062  4,430124  4 
VIZE-www.4vize.cz          3109  55,75841  0,059359  0,865113  1,730226  2 
Česká  strana ná r. soc.  1387  37,24245  0,026482  0,577831  1,155662  1 
Moravané                       12552  112,0357  0,239651  1,738277  3,476554  3 
Strana zelený ch               336487  580,075  6,424435  9,000086  18,00017  18 
Humanistická  strana       857  29,27456  0,016362  0,454206  0,908412  1 
KSČM                               685328  827,8454  13,08474  12,84434  25,68868  26 
Koalice pro Českou republiku  8140  90,22195  0,155414  1,399828  2,799656  3 
Ná rodní  strana                9341  96,64885  0,178345  1,499544  2,999088  3 
Folklor i společnost  574  23,9583  0,010959  0,371722  0,743444  0 
KDU ČSL                      386706  621,8569  7,38325  9,648348  19,2967  19 
Nezá vislí  demokraté  Ž elezný   36708  191,5933  0,700854  2,972644  5,945288  6 
Strana Rovnost šancí   10879  104,3024  0,207709  1,618292  3,236585  3 
total  5237612  6445,216  100  100  200  200 
 
Source: www.volby.cz, own calculations 
 
  Even if we accept the square root principle of fairness, the implementation has week 
formal points (optimal quota approximation).    12 
  In the case of Shapley-Shubik power fair distribution of power among member states 
in the Council voting should be equal to the share of population.
2 If pi is size of population in 
member state i, than 1/pi is Shapley-Shubik voting power of a single citizen of country i in 






























(the same for every citizen of EU). For voting weights proportional to share of population we 
can find a quota minimizing distance between “fair” SS-power distribution and the power 



















The choice of “fairness principle” is a problem of political consensus of member states 
and cannot be resolved by “ scientific community” and by mathematical models, but 
clarification, clear formulation and representation of the problem can be of help in political 
decisions. From that point of view square root rule discussion is useful and legitimate. What is 
wrong is that it is presented as the only correct way how to deal with the problem and creates 
illusion that “ fairness” issue has been solved 
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2 Supporters of square root rule associates its justification exclusively with  Penrose-Banzhaf power concept. Their 
objections to Shapley-Shubik power concept are based on classification of power measures on so called I-power 
(voter’s potential influence over the outcome of voting) and P power (expected relative share in a fixed pri ze 
available to the winning group of committee members, based on cooperative game theory) introduced by Felsenthal, 
Machover and Zwicker (1998).  Shapley-Shubik power index was declared to represent P - power and as such 
unusable for measuring influence in voting. We tried to show (Turnovec (2007)) that objections against Shapley-
Shubik power index, based on its interpretation as a P-power concept, are not sufficiently justified. Both Shapley-
Shubik and Penrose-Banzhaf measure could be successfully derived as cooperative game values, and at the same 
time both of them can be interpreted as probabilities of being in some decisive position (pivot,  swing) without using 
cooperative game theory at all.  
   13 
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